BYU Law Review
Volume 1980 | Issue 2

Article 11

5-1-1980

Constitutional Law-Free Exercise of Religion-State
May Require a Photograph on a Drivers License
Though the Licensee's Religious Beliefs Prohibits
Photographs of Any Type--Johnson v. Motor
Vehicle Division, 593 P.2d 1363 (Colo. 1979)

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the First Amendment Commons
Recommended Citation
Constitutional Law-Free Exercise of Religion-State May Require a Photograph on a Drivers License Though the Licensee's Religious Beliefs
Prohibits Photographs of Any Type--Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Division, 593 P.2d 1363 (Colo. 1979), 1980 BYU L. Rev. 471 (1980).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol1980/iss2/11

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

Constitutional L~W-FREEEXERCISEOF RELIGIONSTATE

MAYREQUIRE
A PHOTOGRAPH
ON A DRIVERS
LICENSE
THOUGH
THE
LICENSEE'S
RELIGIOUS
BELIEFSPROHIBIT
PHOTOGRAPHS
OF ANY
TYPE--Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Division, 593 P.2d 1363 (Colo.
1979).
The plaintiffs in Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Diuisionl were
members of the Assembly of YHWHHOSHUA, a small religious
group located in Pueblo, Colorado. Their religion teaches that
photographs are graven images and therefore forbids the taking
of photographs.' As a result, when the plaintiffs applied for Colorado driving permits they refused to allow their photographs to
be taken.' Since the state statute required a photograph on each
driving permit: the Motor Vehicle Division refused to issue permits to them.Vn Johnson, Assembly members attacked the
state's application of the photograph requirement to them as a
violation of their constitutional right to the free exercise of
religion?

The first amendment of the United States Constitution
states that "Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free
exercise" of religion.' In Reynolds v. United States: the Supreme Court first announced that beliefs but not actions were
1. 593 P.2d 1363 (Colo. 1979).
2. Id. at 1363. The Assembly of YHWHHOSHUA derives this doctrine from a literal interpretation of Exodus 20:4 that states: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any
graven image, or any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth
beneath, or that is in the water under the earth." See also Deuteronomy 5:8.
3. 593 P.2d at 1364.
4. "Every application for a driver's, minor driver's, or provisional driver's license,
and the license issued as a result of said application, shall also contain the photograph of
the applicant or licensee. Such photograph shall be taken and processed with equipment
leased or owned by the department." COLO.REV. STAT.5 42-2-106(3) (1973).
5. 593 P.2d at 1364.
6. Assembly members claimed that the photograph requirement violates their right
to the free exercise of religion as guaranteed by both the first amendment of the United
States Constitution and article 11, section 4 of the Colorado Constitution. Id.
7. U.S. CONST.amend. I. The free exercise clause of the first amendment was made
wholly applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Cantwe11 v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
8. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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protected by the free exercise clause? Later, in Cantwell v. Connecticut,1° the Court again considered the scope of the free exercise clause and concluded that religious conduct as well as belief
may be protected in appropriate circumstance^.^^
Since Cantwell, courts have struggled with the question of
when religiously motivated conduct can be circumscribed by the
government and have necessarily resorted to a balancing test."
Two important Supreme Court decisions, Sherbert v. VernerlS
and Braunfeld v. Brown," illustrate the difficulty in applying a
balancing test to delicate free exercise clause issues.
A.

The Sherbert Test

A particularly difficult issue to resolve arises when a government regulation does not require an individual to act contrary to
his religious belief but conditions the receipt of benefits on such
conduct. In Sherbert, a South Carolina statute provided that an
unemployed person's failure to accept suitable work rendered
the claimant ineligible for unemployment benefits." The state
Employment Security Commission determined that Sherbert's
refusal to work Saturdays, even though motivated by religious
beliefs, placed her within the disqualifying provision.16
In determining whether the imposition of such a burden on
religious beliefs violated the free exercise clause, the United
States Supreme Court enunciated a two-part test. In order to
justify the burden placed on Sherbert, the state had to show (1)
that the compelling state interests served by the regulation outweighed the burden imposed, and (2) that no less burdensome
alternative forms of regulation existed to achieve the state interests.'' In applying this two-pronged test, the Court determined
9. The Court a r m e d a bigamy conviction of a Mormon despite his claim that the
practice of plural marriage constituted a basic tenet of his faith. The Court stated that
"[l]aws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with
mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices." Id. at 166.
10. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
11. Id. at 303-04.
12. For an examination of the balancing test as applied by the courts in weighing
religious liberty claims against various governmental regulations that promote health,
safety, morals, or welfare, see Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishrnent, and Doctrinal Development, 80 HAW. L. REV.1381 (1967).
13. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
14. 366 U.S.599 (1961).
15. 374 U.S.at 400-01.
16. Id. at 401.
17. Id. at 406-07.
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that even if compelling state interests were found, the state had
failed to satisfy the second prong of its burden." Focusing on
whether an acceptable alternative form of regulation existed, the
Court decided that granting an exemption to Sherbert constituted an adequate alternative since an exemption would not interfere with the state interests served by the unemployment
statute.'@Consequently, to condition the availability of unemployment benefits upon Sherbert's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith violated the free exercise
In Braunfeld v. Brown, a case similar to Sherbert but decided two years earlier, the Court applied the same test to reach
a different result. Orthodox Jews claimed that compliance with
Pennsylvania's Sunday closing law placed them at an economic
disadvantage because their religious beliefs required them to
also close on Saturday, their Sabbath." Although the Court recognized the economic burden on the Jewish merchants because
of their religious beliefs, it upheld the validity of the statute."
The state satisfactorily met its two-pronged burden by demonstrating that the statute furthered the important secular goal of
one uniform day of rest and that this goal could not be achieved
by less burdensome means."
Recognizing the apparent inconsistency between its decision
in Braunfeld and its decision in Sherbert, the Sherbert Court
attempted to distinguish the two cases. First, it examined the
nature of the burden imposed on the Sabbatarians by the respective regulatory schemes? In Braunfeld, the Sunday closing
law imposed a lesser burden upon religious practice in that observance of the Jewish Sabbath only resulted in one extra day of
lost profits? In Sherbert, however, the burden resulted in the
termination of Sherbert's sole source of income during her
unemployment.
Although this distinction focusing on the extent of the religious burden imposed cannot be overlooked, perhaps the greatest difference between Sherbert and Braunfeld concerns the
18. Id. at 407-09.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 410.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

366 U.S. at 601.
Id. at 609.
Id. at 608.
374 U.S. at 408.
See

id.
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presence or absence of less burdensome alternative^.'^ The statutes in neither case would constitute a religious burden when
applied to the vast majority of people. Consequently, in determining whether adequate alternatives existed, the Court considered whether providing an exemption for Sabbatarians constituted an alternative. In making this inquiry the Court focused
on the impact an exemption would have on the overall statutory
In Braunfeld, the Court determined that the state's interest
in providing one uniform day of rest could only be achieved by
declaring Sunday to be that day of rest." To grant an exemption
to Sabbatarians "appeared to present an administrative problem
of such magnitude, or to afford the exempted class so great a
competitive advantage, that such a requirement would have rendered the entire statutory scheme unw~rkable.'"~
In Sherbert, on the other hand, the Court decided that the
state did not establish that an exemption would undermine the
purposes of the statute.s0 In support of its decision, the Court
observed that the statutory scheme automatically exempted
those whose religious views prohibited Sunday work.s1 The
Court also noted that other states granted unemployment benefits to persons unable to find suitable employment because of a
religious prohibition against Saturday work." Therefore, an exemption for Sherbert provided an acceptable alternative.
B. Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of Prayer
In Bureau of Motor Vehicles v. Pentecostal House of
26. That there was disagreement among the Justices concerning which statutory
scheme imposed a greater burden on the respective Sabbatarians suggests that other
factors may have been more pivotal in distinguishing Sherbert from Braunfeld. In the
dissenting opinion in Sherbert, Justices Harlan and White stated that
[fjorcing a store owner to close his business on Sunday may well have the effect of depriving him of a satisfactory livelihood if his religious convictions require him to close on Saturday as well. Here we are dealing only with temporary benefits, amounting to a fraction of regular weekly wages and running for
not more that 22 weeks.
Id. at 421.
27. 374 U.S. at 408-09.
28. Id. at 408.
29. Id. a t 408-09 (footnote omitted).
30. Id. at 409.
31. Id. at 406.
32. Id. at 407 n.7.
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Prayer,33 the Indiana Supreme Court employed the Sherbert
test and the impact-of-an-exemption form of analysis to determine whether the photograph requirement for driving permits
unconstitutionally infringed upon the applicant's free exercise of
religion.34 Members of the Pentecostal House of Prayer, believing photographs to be graven images,g5 refused to be photographed when they applied for driving licenses and therefore
were not issued permits." The court found that enforcement of
the state's photograph requirement infringed upon the free exercise of the Pentecostals' religious beliefs since it forced them to
choose between an important religious principle and their right
to drive?'
In defense of its photograph requirement, the state advanced two interests served by its practice: (1)the state's interest in assuring the competency of Indiana drivers is achieved by
constantly checking each driver's knowledge, ability and obedience, and (2) the photograph requirement gives the state a
means of rapid, positive identification in furthering highway
safety.38
Although the court agreed that the state has a strong interest in assuring driver competence, it stressed that having one's
photograph on a drivers license does not in any way affect drivAn individual must satisfy the same standards
ing competen~e.~~
of competence to receive a drivers license regardless of whether
the license includes a photograph.
The court found the interest in speedy identification to be
more persuasive but nevertheless granted relief to the Pentecostal members since the state had not shown the absence of less
33. 269 Ind. 361, 380 N.E.2d 1225 (1978).
34. Id. at 362-63, 380 N.E.2d a t 1226.
35. Id. The Pentecostal House of Prayer follows a literal interpretation of Deuteronomy 5:8 which provides: "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image, or any likeness of anything that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the
water beneath the earth." See also Exodus 20:4.
36. 269 Ind. at 362-63, 380 N.E.2d a t 1226.
Every such permit or license shall bear thereon the distinguishing number assigned to the permittee or licensee and shall contain the name, age, residence
address, a brief description, and, with the exception of a learner's permit, a
photograph of such person for the purpose of identification, and such additional information as the commissioner shall deem necessary, also a space for
the signature of the permittee or licensee.
IND.CODE5 9-1-4-37(b) (1976).
37. 269 Ind. a t 367, 380 N.E.2d a t 1228.
38. Id. at 368-69, 380 N.E.2d a t 1229.
39. Id.
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burdensome alternative~.~~
The court emphasized that "[tlhe
statistics which are traditionally included on a driver's license,
such as license number, height, weight, eye and hair color, have
long proven adequate to enable the Bureau to fulfill its important duties."41 The court further stressed that few people would
find it advantageous to seek an exemption in the first place since
a photograph on a license is desirable for various business transactions such as cashing checks." Accordingly, an exemption for
Pentecostal members provided an acceptable alternative since it
would not undermine the asserted state interests?

The Johnson court declined to follow Pentecostal House of
Prayer and held that the photograph requirement for Colorado
drivers licenses was not unconstitutional as applied to Assembly
members. The court acknowledged the sincerity and religious
nature of the Assembly members' belief and agreed that the
photograph requirement imposed a burden on their free exercise
of religion? Nonetheless, the court held that the state satisfied
the requirements of the Sherbert test by demonstrating that
compelling state interests were served by the photograph requirement and that no less burdensome alternative forms of regulation were available. Specifically, the Colorado Supreme Court
concluded that an exemption for Assembly members would undermine the essential purposes of the photograph requirement."
40. Id. at 369, 380 N.E.2d at 1229.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. To illustrate the difficulties encountered by the Indiana Supreme Court in
applying the Sherbert test to free exercise claims, compare Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind.
Employment Sec. Div., 391 N.E.2d 1127 (Ind. 1979). The court held that the state's denial of unemployment compensation to a Jehovah's Witness who refused to work in an
armaments plant for religious reasons did not violate the free exercise clause. The majority opinion attempted to distinguish Thomas from Pentecostal House of Prayer b y stating that a literal reading of the Bible prompted the Pentecostal belief, but it was unclear
what prompted the Jehovah's Witness belief. Id. at 1133. Two justices dissented, contending that Sherbert required that the withholding of unemployment benefits from
Thomas be declared unconstitutional. The dissent relied on Lincoln v. True, 408 F.
Supp. 22 (W.D. Ky. 1975), which involved a fact situation similar to Thomas, as a proper
interpretation of Sherbert. 391 N.E.2d at 1135 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
44. 593 P.2d at 1364-65.
45. Id. at 1365.
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This analysis of the court's application of the Sherbert test
to the facts in Johnson considers (1) the nature of the burden
imposed on the Assembly members, and (2) the state's attempt
to justify that burden. Special consideration ,will be given to the
impact that an exemption for Assembly members would have on
the state interests involved.

A. The Burden on the Individual
The Johnson court recognized that the photograph requirement imposed a burden on the Assembly member's free exercise
of religion? However, the court attempted to distinguish the
nature of the burden imposed by the regulatory program in
Johnson from that imposed in Sherbert.'? This distinction was
apparently drawn to demonstrate why the burden in Johnson
should be given less weight in balancing it against the state interests, thereby enabling the state interests to outweigh the individual's interest in the free exercise of religion. The statute in
Sherbert granted an automatic exemption where religious beliefs
precluded work on Sunday, whereas no such exemption was extended to Sabbatarians. The photograph requirement in Johnson involved no discrimination based on religion-every regular
driving permit had to include the photograph of the licensee.48
The distinction drawn by the Johnson court is superficial at
best. The court should have looked more closely at the degree to
which the photograph requirement interfered with the Assembly
members' free exercise of religion rights. Had the court done so,
it may well have decided that the burden was not only comparable to the burden in Sherbert, but in some respects more onerous. Similar to Sherbert, Johnson involved the deprivation of a
government benefit because of the Assembly members' refusal to
comply with the photograph requirement.'. Unlike the denial of
46. Id.
47. See id. at 1366.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1364. The Colorado Supreme Court has stated that
[elvery citizen has an inalienable right to make use of the public highways of
the state; every citizen has full freedom to travel from place to place in the
enjoyment of life and liberty. The limitations which may be placed upon this
inherent right of the citizen must be based upon a proper exercise of the police
power of the state in the protection of the public health, safety and welfare.
Any unreasonable restraint upon the freedom of the individual to make use of
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unemployment benefits in Sherbert, which is temporary, the refusal to issue Assembly members driving permits results in a
permanent handicap of their mobility that could hinder both
their employment opportunities and the fulfillment of their
church duties. Because of this substantial infringement on the
Assembly members' free exercise of religion, rather than minimizing the severity of the burden on the individual, the court
should have placed a heavier burden on the state to satisfy its
requirements under the Sherbert test.

B. The Compelling State InterestlLeast Restrictive
Alternative Test
The Johnson court discussed three interests presented by
the state that the photograph requirement served: (1) a photograph on a license facilitates the enforcement of highway safety
by providing police officers with a ready means of verifying that
the license belongs to the person presenting it, (2) negatives
from the photos are filed by the Motor Vehicle Department and
used in police photographic lineups and in identifying victims of
natural disaster and traffic accidents, and (3) the state statutorily exempts from liability those who rely on drivers licenses for
identification; the presence of a photograph on the drivers license makes such reliance more dependable. The court found
these interests to be compelling."
In light of the significant burden imposed on Assembly
members, it is arguable that these state interests do not outweigh the burden or are not om pel ling.^^ However, regardless of
whether the state satisfies the first prong of its burden under the
Sherbert test, the court should have held for the Assembly
members because a less burdensome alternative exists.
Sherbert demonstrates that an exemption to accommodate
certain religious beliefs may be an adequate alternative when
this accommodation does not prevent the state from substanthe public highways cannot be sustained.
People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210, 214, 363 P.2d 180, 182 (1961).
50. 593 P.2d at 1365-66.
51. In Sherbert, the Court stated: "It is basic that no showing merely of a rational
relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[olnly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion
for permissible limitation.' " 374 U.S. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516,
530 (1945)). Although the asserted state interests "rationally relate" to the photograph
requirement, it is debatable just how "paramoun't" these interests are when weighed
against the onerous burden imposed on Assembly members.
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tially achieving its purposes.52 In holding that an exemption was
not an adequate alternative to the photograph requirement, the
Johnson court attempted to distinguish the impact that an exemption had on the state interests in Sherbert from the impact
that it would have in Johnson. To allow Sherbert to receive unemployment benefits did not conflict with the underlying purpose of the statute which was to provide temporary relief for the
Presumably Sherbert would eventuinvoluntarily unernpl~yed.~~
ally find suitable work that did not require working on Saturdays. In contrast, the court found that "photographic identification is an indispensable underpinning of the purposes
underlying the state's interest in issuing drivers licenses. To provide exemptions would undermine its essential purpose^."^
Unfortunately, the court failed to explain why an exemption
would undermine the statute's essential purposes. Perhaps a
closer scrutiny of the state interests involved would have found
an exemption to be an adequate alternative. Indeed, the granting of an exemption from the photograph requirement to Assembly members would only minimally affect those interests asserted by the state.
1. The state interest in enforcing highway safety

The specific state interest served by the photograph requirement, which is to provide a means of ready identification of
those who operate motor vehicles, is at most indirectly related to
the enforcement of highway safety.55As elucidated in Pentecostal House of Prayer, the presence of a photograph on a drivers
52. 374 U.S.at 408-09.
53. 593 P.2d at 1365.
54. Id.
55. The major purpose of driver licensing regulations is to further highway safety by
promoting driver competence. The Colorado statutes provide:
(1) No person, except those expressly exempted in section 42-2-102, shall drive
any motor vehicle upon a highway in this state unless such person has a valid
license prepared and issued by the department under this article. . . . (2) The
department upon issuing a driver's license shall indicate thereon the type or
general class of vehicles the licensee may drive. The department shall establish
such qualifications as it deems reasonably necessary for the safe operation of
the various types, sizes, or combinations of vehicles and shall appropriately
examine each applicant to determine his qualifications, according to the type
or general class of license for which he has applied.
COLO.REV. STAT.5 42-2-101 (1973). The prohibition against driving without a license
and the issuance of various types of operator's licenses conditioned upon compliance
with certain qualifications tends to restrict the use of the highways to competent drivers.
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license is wholly unrelated to driving competen~e.~
After competence is established and a drivers license is issued, the actual
enforcement of driving safety arises only as violations occur.67
Police officers may stop traffic violators regardless of whether a
photograph is on a license.
Although Assembly members were willing to have their
fingerprints and a complete physical description on their licenses, the court determined that "the exigencies of law enforcement cannot brook the delay inherent in other means of identification."" However, just what exigencies require a photograph as
opposed to these other means of identification is unclear since
the court failed to define "exigencies of law enforcement."
That certain classes of driving permits do not require photographs indicates that to allow Assembly members to use permits without photographs would not significantly hinder the enforcement of highway safety. Colorado driving licenses that do
not require photographs on them include temporary and probationary licenses." Also, temporary drivers of road machines or
implements of husbandry need not obtain drivers licenses. Military personnel and nonresidents with valid drivers licenses from
other states need not obtain Colorado drivers licenses, regardless
of whether their out-of-state permits include photograph^.^^ If
these exceptions to the photograph requirement do not render
the statutory scheme unworkable, it is difficult to understand
how an exemption for Assembly members, a small religious
group, would. The sounder view, stressed in Pentecostal House
of Prayer, is that the physical characteristics traditionally described on a drivers license should be more than adequate to
enable the state to fulfill its interest in promoting highway
safety through identification of those who operate motor
56. 269 Ind. at 368-69, 380 N.E.2d a t 1229.
57. The Colorado Supreme Court held that a police officer can only demand the
license of a driver whose vehicle has been stopped for otherwise valid purposes. Police
officers do not have unlimited authority to stop any automobile at any time for any
reason to request the display of a drivers license. People v. McPherson, 191 Colo. 81, 550
P.2d 311 (1976).
58. 593 P.2d at 1365.
59. In response to the Assembly members' request for admissions, the Motor Vehicle Department admitted that licenses issued pursuant to sections 42-2-105 (temporary)
and 42-2-123(11) (probationary) of the Colorado Revised Statutes do not require the
licensee's photograph. Answer to Plaintiffs7 Request for Admissions, Johnson v. Motor
Vehicle Division, 593 P.2d 1363 (Colo. 1979).
60. See COLO.REV.STAT.5 42-2-102 (1973).
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2. The state interest in the negatives

The state interests served by the negatives obtained in taking photographs for driving permits involve two aspects: (1)use
in criminal identification procedures, and (2) identification of
traffic accident and natural disaster victims.62However, the Motor Vehicle Division's refusal to issue a drivers license to an Assembly member because of his failure to comply with the photograph requirement does not provide an alternate means of
obtaining the Assembly member's negative. The state's interests
are frustrated, regardless of whether an Assembly member is
permitted to receive a drivers license without submitting to the
photograph requirement. Either way the state is not going to
have the use of photographs of Assembly members. Thus, the
state interest in using the negatives will not be furthered by refusing to issue drivers licenses without photographs to Assembly
members?
Even if the Assembly members had succumbed to the
state's desires and complied with the photograph requirement in
order to obtain driving permits, these state interests would only
be minimally enhanced. Police photographic lineups can be effectively administered without using any photographs of Assembly members. The negatives provided by other applicants for
driving permits produce a sufticient pool from which to draw
photographs for comparison with a criminal suspect's photograph. Also, if an Assembly member is a criminal suspect and
has a prior record, his photograph is probably already on file
and available for comparison in a photographic lineup. Should
there be no photograph of a suspected Assembly member, the
state could employ the same procedures used with certain other
suspects for whom the state does not have a photograph, such as
nonresidents or nondrivers. Procedures such as a police station
showup can accomplish the same objectives as a photographic
61. See 269 Ind. at 369, 380 N.E.2d at 1229.
62. 593 P.2d at 1365.
63. It is also arguable that the interests served by the negatives are not so compelling as to outweigh the religious burden imposed by the photograph requirement. If
negatives of Assembly members were essential for the accomplishment of these state
interests, the state should require everyone to have their photographs taken whether
they are applying for drivers licenses or not. Of course, such a proposition is ridiculous.
See note 51 supra.

.
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lineup without greatly burdening law enforcement resources."
Regarding the state interest in identifying traffic accident or
natural disaster victims, the state is not concerned with a means
of immediate identification so much as it is with a reliable
method of identification? Consequently, for the limited purposes asserted by the state, a complete physical description and
fingerprint should suffice in most instance^:^ and could be even
more trustworthy in some cir~umstances.~~
3. The state interest in protecting those who rely on the

license
The statutory exemption from liability for reliance on drivers licenseses applies to any license issued pursuant to article 2
of the Motor Licensing Regulations, including licenses that require no photograph. By analogy, an exemption from the photograph requirement for Assembly members should not detract
from this state interest. Indeed, parties could rely on an Assembly member's license in the same manner that they presently
rely on other article 2 licenses that bear no photograph.
Furthermore, no one is required to actually rely on any license. If someone refused to rely on an Assembly member's li64. A station showup may be more time consuming than a photographic lineup;
therefore, it will normally be used only in those rare instances in which no photograph
exists for the suspected Assembly member. An Assembly member suspected of criminal
conduct can be subjected to a police station showup without invoking any formal indictment procedures. Also, an accused is not entitled to representation of counsel under the
sixth amendment if the showup takes place at a police station before the accused has
been indicted or otherwise formally charged with any criminal offense. Kirby v. Illinois,
406 U.S. 682 (1972).
65. Brief for Appellee a t 7, Johnson v. Motor Vehicle Division, 593 P.2d 1363 (Colo.
1979). The state did not assert that it had an interest in the negatives in order to make
immediate identifications of traffic accident and natural disaster victims. Even if the
state had asserted this interest, an exemption for Assembly members would not hamper
the state's use of the negatives in immediately identifying the vast majority of victims. In
the rare situation where an Assembly member was a victim, his identity could be determined by using the same procedures that the state employs to identify other victims for
whom the state does not have a photograph. Furthermore, the Assembly member who
may be subject to a delay in his identification would rather be confronted with this possibility than have his picture taken.
66. For information on the reliability of fingerprinting, see A. MOENSSENS,
FINGERPRINTS AND THE LAW108-203 (1969). See generally R. FOOTE,FINGERPRINT
IDENTIFICATION: A SURYEY
OF PRESENTTECHNOLOGY,
AUTOMATED
APPLICATION
AND POTENTIAL
FOR
FUTURE
DEVELOPMENT
(Criminal Justice Monograph Vol. V, No. 2, 1974).
67. See State v. Mares, 113 Utah 225, 192 P.2d 861 (1948) (decomposed corpse identified solely through use of fingerprints).
68. COLO.REV.STAT.§ 42-2-112(5) (1973).

4711

CASENOTES

483

cense because it bore no photograph, the only person injured
would be the Assembly member. As emphasized in Pentecostal
House of Prayer, it is to a person's advantage to possess a license with a photograph for business transactions such as cashing
Therefore, unlike Braunfeld where an exemption
could possibly have encouraged others to seek exempted status,1° few persons would desire to seek an exemption from the
photograph requirement unless for bona fide religious reasons.
The asserted state interest in protecting those relying on licenses, like the other interests previously discussed, can be sufficiently safeguarded while granting a religious exemption to Assembly members. Consequently, the court should not have found
that the state met the second prong of its burden under the
Sherbert test which requires a showing that there is no alternative that is less restrictive of the free exercise of religion.

IV. CONCLUSION
In Johnson, the Colorado Supreme Court correctly recognized that the photograph requirement for drivers licenses infringed upon the Assembly members' free exercise of religion.
However, the court erroneously concluded that the state satisfied its two-pronged burden under the Sherbert test. Since an
exemption from the photograph requirement for Assembly
members would be an acceptable less-burdensome alternative,
the court should have found the application of the photograph
requirement to Assembly members to be an unconstitutional violation of the free exercise of religion clause.
Lynn R. Ledbetter

69. 269 Ind. at 369, 380 N.E.2d at 1229.
70. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. at 609.

